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This paper analyzes an agent’s option exercise decision under uncertainty. The agent decides
whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by immediate gratiﬁcation and
suﬀers from self-control problems. This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer self-control
utility model. Unlike the time inconsistent hyperbolic discounting model, it provides an
explanation of procrastination and preproperation based on time consistency. When applied
to the investment and exit problems, it is shown that (i) if the project value is immediate,
an investor may invest in negative NPV projects; (ii) if the production cost is immediate,
a ﬁrm may exit even if it makes positive net proﬁts; and (iii) if both rewards and costs are
immediate, an agent may simply follow the myopic rule which compares only the current
period beneﬁt and cost.
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Suppose you have a referee report to write today. You feel writing the referee report is unpleasant
and prefer to put oﬀ and do it tomorrow. But when tomorrow comes, you tend to delay again.
This phenomenon is often referred to as procrastination – wait when you should do it. Suppose
you have a coupon to see one movie over the next several weeks, and your allowance does not
permit you to pay for a movie. You tend to see a movie in an earlier week even though there
may be a better movie in a later week. This phenomenon is often referred to as preproperation
– do it when you should wait.1 Procrastination and preproperation are often explained by
the combination of time inconsistent preferences (or the hyperbolic discounting model) and a
temporal gap between the costs and rewards associated to an action (O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a)).2 The key intuition is that an agent with hyperbolic discounting preferences has a
present bias; that is, he discounts short-term events more heavily than long-term events.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative explanation of these phenomena in a
general environment where an agent with time-consistent preferences makes irreversible binary
choices under uncertainty and possibly inﬁnite horizon. I adopt the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001,
2004) self-control utility model and interpret those phenomena as an agent’s struggling with
temptations.3 In this model, preferences are deﬁned over a domain of sets of alternatives or
decision problems. Utility depends on the decision problem from which current consumption
is chosen. The interpretation is that temptation has to do with not just what the agent has
consumed, but also what he could have consumed. The agent also seeks immediate gratiﬁcation
because an immediate beneﬁt constitutes a temptation to the agent, but not because it has a
higher relative weight. The agent may either succumb to temptations or exercise costly self-
control to resist temptations.
The Gul-Pesendorfer model is time consistent because utility satisﬁes recursivity. Thus,
the standard recursive methods such as backward induction and dynamic programming can be
applied. In addition to its tractability, the Gul-Pesendorfer model has clear welfare implications
because it is based on the standard revealed preference principle. This is in contrast to the
hyperbolic discounting model where there is no generally agreed welfare criterion. This is because
1These examples and the term “preproperation” are borrowed from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a).
2Strotz (1956) ﬁrst studies time-inconsistent preferences in economics. Akerlof (1991) analyzes procrastination,
but frames his discussion very diﬀerently. The O’Donoghue and Rabin model has been generalized by a number
of papers, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001), Brocas and Carrillo (2001a, 2001b). The hyperbolic
discounting model has been applied to study consumption/saving (Laibson (1994, 1997), job search (DellaVigna
and Paserman (2004)), social security (Imrohoroglu et al (2003)), and retirement (Diamond and Koszegi (2003)).
3The Gul-Pesendorfer model has been applied to study taxation (Krusell and Smith (2001)), asset pricing
(Krusell et al (2002), DeJong and Ripoll (2003)), and nonlinear pricing (Esteban et al (2003)).
1the agent at diﬀerent dates is treated as a separate self. An alternative or a policy may be
preferred by some selves, while it may make other selves worse oﬀ. The Pareto eﬃciency criterion
and the long-run ex ante utility criterion are often adopted.
In section 2, I model an agent’s irreversible binary choice problem under uncertainty as
an option exercise problem, or more technically, an optimal stopping problem. Irreversibility
and uncertainty are important in many binary choice problems such as entry, exit, default,
liquidation, project investment, and job search. According to the standard theory (see Dixit
and Pindyck (1994)), all these problems can be viewed as a problem where agents decide when to
exercise an “option” analogous to a ﬁnancial call option – it has the right but not the obligation
to buy an asset at some future time of its choosing. This real options approach emphasizes the
positive option value of waiting.
Unlike the standard theory, I make the distinction according to whether rewards and costs
are immediate or delayed, as in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). This distinction is important to
explain procrastination and preproperation in the hyperbolic discounting model since it makes
present bias critical. This distinction is also important in the present model since it makes
immediate temptation critical. After stating the model setup and assumptions, I present the
self-control utility model developed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) and compare it with the
hyperbolic discounting model. I then provide a few three-period examples in both deterministic
and stochastic environments. These examples illustrate the key intuition behind the reason why
an agent with self-control preferences may procrastinate or preproperate. I show that, when the
agent does not have enough self-control, he cannot resist temptations and thus procrastinates
or preproperates. Following these examples, I present propositions to characterize the optimal
stopping rules for the general inﬁnite-horizon model when the agent has self-control preferences.
I describe the optimal stopping rules as a trigger policy whereby the agent stops the ﬁrst time
the state process hits a threshold value. I also explain the impact of temptation and self-control
on the optimal stopping rules. In particular, I show that the cost of self-control may lower the
beneﬁt from both stopping and continuation. Moreover, it may outweigh the option value of
waiting. Unlike the ﬁnite-horizon examples, procrastination and preproperation can occur as
long as there is a temptation.
In Section 3, I apply the results in Section 2 to investment and exit problems when the
decision maker has self-control preferences. I also conduct welfare analysis. The investment
and exit problems represent two diﬀerent classes of option exercise problems. The project
investment decision is an example where an agent decides whether or not to exercise an option
to pursue upside potentials. Entry and job search are similar problems. I show the following:
When the investment cost is immediate, the investor is tempted to delay investment. Thus,
2he procrastinates and the welfare loss is the forgone project value, which is equal to the cost
of self-control. When the project value is immediate, the investor is tempted to invest early.
Thus, he preproperates and the welfare loss is the forgone option value of waiting. If his level
of self-control is suﬃciently low, the investor may invest in negative net present value (NPV)
projects. This reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between investing now but incurring ﬁnancial losses and
waiting but incurring self-control costs. When both the project value and investment cost are
immediate, the investor also preproperates and the welfare loss is the forgone option value of
waiting. In this case, he never invests in negative NPV projects. If his level of self-control is
suﬃciently low, he invests according to the myopic rule which compares only the current period
beneﬁt and cost.
After analyzing the investment problem, I turn to the exit problem, in which an owner/manager
with self-control preferences decides when and if to shut down a ﬁrm. This problem represents
an example where an agent decides whether or not to exercise an option to avoid downside po-
tentials. Other examples include default and liquidation decisions. I show the following: When
the proﬁts are immediate, the owner is tempted to stay even when he should exit. Thus, he
procrastinates to exit, even though he incurs substantial losses. The welfare loss is equal to the
cost of self-control. By contrast, when the ﬁxed cost of stay in business is immediate, the owner
is tempted to avoid this cost and preproperates to exit, even though he may make positive net
proﬁts. The welfare loss is the forgone current and future proﬁt opportunities. When both the
cost and proﬁt are immediate, the owner also preproperates, but never exits at a time when he
makes a negative net proﬁts. If the owner’s level of self-control is suﬃciently low, the ﬁrm exits
according to the myopic rule.
Section 4 concludes. Technical details are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
I model an agent’s option exercise decisions as an optimal stopping problem. Speciﬁcally, con-
sider a discrete time and inﬁnite horizon environment. In each period, the agent decides whether
stopping a process and taking a termination payoﬀ, or continuing for one more period, and mak-
ing the same decision in the future. The decision is irreversible in the sense that if the agent
chooses to stop, he makes no further choices. Formally, time is denoted by t = 1,2,..., and
uncertainty is generated by a state process (xt)t≥1. For simplicity, I assume that xt is drawn
identically and independently from a distribution F on [0,A]. Continuation at date t generates a
payoﬀ π (xt) and incurs a cost cc, while stopping at date t yields a payoﬀ Ω(xt) and incurs a cost
cs, where π and Ω are continuous and increasing functions. I will provide extensive examples
3below to illustrate that this simple model covers a wide range of economic applications.
As in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), I make an important distinction according to whether
costs and rewards are obtained immediately or delayed. The term of immediate costs is used
to refer to the situation where the cost is incurred immediately while the reward is delayed.
The term of immediate rewards is used to refer to the situation where the reward is incurred
immediately while the cost is delayed. For simplicity, I consider the case of one period delay
only. In addition, I also consider the case where both costs and rewards are immediate, which is
not explicitly analyzed in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) give
many examples to illustrate that the preceding distinction is meaningful in reality. Moreover,
this distinction is important to generate procrastination and preproperation.
Unlike O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), I also consider uncertainty and inﬁnite horizon.
Uncertainty is prevalent in intertemporal choices and inﬁnite horizon is necessary to analyze
long-run stationary decision problems. These two elements are building blocks in many economic
models, especially in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. Incorporating them allow me to study some
interesting applications in macroeconomics and ﬁnance, as illustrated in Section 3.
2.1 Self-Control Preferences
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) explain procrastination and preproperation by adopting the
time-inconsistent hyperbolic discounting model proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968). This
model can be described as follows. Let Ut (ct,...,cT) represent an agent’s intertemporal pref-
erences from a consumption stream (ct,...,cT) in period t. T could be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The
hyperbolic discounting preferences are represented by






, t ≥ 1,
where 0 < β,δ ≤ 1. Here δ represents long-run, time-consistent discounting and β represents
a ‘bias for the present’. The agent at each point in time is regarded as a separate ‘self’ who
is choosing his current behavior to maximize current preferences, where his future selves will
control his future behavior. In this model, an agent must form expectation about his future
selves’ preferences. Two extreme assumptions are often made. In one extreme, the agent is
naive and believe his future selves’ preferences will be identical to her current self’s, not realizing
changing tastes. In the other extreme, the agent is sophisticated and know exactly what his
future selves’ preferences will be. The solution concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
often adopted. As typical in dynamic games, multiple equilibria may arise.
4The time inconsistency model provides an intuitive interpretation of procrastination and
preproperation. The key intuition relies on the following feature of the hyperbolic discounting
model. When β < 1, the agent gives more relative weight to period t when he makes a choice
in period t than he does when he makes the choice in any period prior to period t. That is,
the agent has a time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratiﬁcation. There seems to be ample
experimental evidence on the time-inconsistent behavior.4 In a typical experiment, subjects
choose between a smaller period t reward and a larger period t+1 reward. If the choice is made
in period t then the smaller earlier reward is chosen. If the choice is made earlier, then the larger
later reward is chosen.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) propose an alternative interpretation of this behavior based
on time-consistent preferences. Their key insight is that the agent ﬁnds immediate rewards
tempting. When the agent makes the choice in period t, the period t reward constitutes a
temptation to the agent. So he may choose a smaller period t reward rather than a larger
period t + 1 reward. However, if he makes a choice prior to period t, neither period t reward
nor period t+1 reward can be consumed immediately and hence his decisions are unaﬀected by
temptations.
To capture this intuition, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) develop a model of self-control
based on a choice theoretic axiomatic foundation.5 They deﬁne self-control preferences over
sets of alternative consumption levels or decision problems – a domain diﬀerent from the usual
one. The interpretation is that temptation has to do with not just what the agent chooses, but
what he could have chosen. Speciﬁcally, let Bt be the agent’s period t decision problem and Wt
represent his intertemporal utility in period t. Then the self-control preferences are represented
by
Wt (Bt) = max
ct∈Bt
{ut (ct) + vt (ct) + δE [Wt+1 (Bt+1)]} − max
ct∈Bt
vt (ct), t ≥ 1. (1)
If T is ﬁnite, since there is no continuation problem in period T,
WT (BT) = max
cT∈BT
{uT (cT) + vT (cT)} − max
cT∈BT
vT (cT). (2)
Here ut + δWt+1 represents the commitment utility in period t and vt is the temptation utility
in period t. The expression ut (ct) + vt (ct) + δE [Wt+1 (Bt+1)] reﬂects the comprise between
commitment and temptation. The agent’s optimal choice in period t maximizes this expression.
When this choice is identical to the temptation choice in the second maximum, the agent suc-
cumbs to the temptation and there is no self-control cost. However, when the two choices do
4See, for example, Thaler (1981), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), Kirby and Herrnstein (1995).
5See Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) for detailed axioms. The key axiom is set betweenness. Their model is
more general than the one presented in this paper.
5not coincide, the agent exercises costly self-control and vt (ct) − maxct∈Bt vt (ct) represents the
cost of self-control. If T = ∞, I consider a stationary model and drop time subscripts,
W (B) = max
c∈B









Here B0 denotes the choice problem in the next period and E [·] denotes the expectation operator.
An important feature of the Gul-Pesendorfer model is that it is time consistent since utility in
(1)-(3) is deﬁned recursively. Thus, the usual recursive method such as backward induction and
dynamic programming can be applied. Importantly, in addition to this tractability, this model
has clear welfare implications. That is, this model follows the revealed preference tradition of
standard economic models: if the agent chooses one alternative over another, then he is better oﬀ
with that choice. By contrast, time inconsistent models do not have a universally agreed welfare
criterion. Some researchers such as Laibson (1994, 1997) adopt a Pareto eﬃciency criterion,
requiring all period selves weakly prefer one strategy to another. Other researchers such as
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) adopt an ex ante long-run utility criterion. The problem of
the welfare analysis of the time inconsistent models is that the connection between choice and
welfare is broken.
In the present paper, I adopt the Gul-Pesendorfer model to analyze the option exercise
problem. In this problem, the set B consists of two elements {stop, continue} since the choice
problems are binary. If the agent chooses to stop, then there is no continuation problem so
that B0 = ∅ and W (B0) = 0. If the agent chooses to continue, then he faces the same decision
problem in the next period and hence B0 = {stop, continue}. To simplify exposition, I always
assume risk neutrality. That is, u(c) = c and v (c) = λc, λ > 0. Here λ is the self-control
parameter. An increases in λ raises the weight on the temptation utility and leads to a decrease
in the agent’s (instantaneous) self-control.6 When λ = 0, the model reduces to the standard
time-additive expected utility model with exponential discounting.
2.2 Examples
To understand the intuition behind the results below, I consider six simple examples. In the
ﬁrst three examples, the environment is deterministic and similar to O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a). Speciﬁcally, an agent has an activity to complete. He has T < ∞ periods to do it and
can do it exactly once. In each period t, the agent must choose either to do it or to wait. If
he does the activity in period t, he receives reward vt and incurs a cost It. If he waits, he then
6See Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) for the deﬁnition and characterization of measures of self-control. To distin-
guish between diﬀerences in impatience and diﬀerences in self-control, one should ﬁx intertemporal choices and












Figure 1: Rewards from the activity
will face the same choice in period t + 1. I assume that if the agent is indiﬀerent between doing
the activity and waiting, the agent does it. I normalize the utility from not doing the activity
to be zero. Moreover, there are three periods T = 3 and there is no discounting, δ = 1. Let τ
and τ∗ denote the period in which the agent does the activity if he has standard preferences or
self-control preferences, respectively. Let v = {v1,...,vT} and I = {I1,...,IT}.
The remaining three examples study the same problem. The only diﬀerence is that there is
uncertainty over rewards. Speciﬁcally, I assume that the initial value of the reward is x = 100.
In periods 2 and 3, the value of rewards may go up or down by 50% with equal probabilities
(see Figure 1). These events are independent. Moreover, I assume costs are deterministic and
equal to I in each period.
Example 1: (Preproperation) Suppose rewards are immediate, v = {2,3,4}, and I = {1,1,3}.
Then, τ = 2, τ∗ = 1 if λ ≥ 0.5, and τ∗ = 2 if 0 ≤ λ < 0.5.
Since there is no discounting, an agent with standard preferences chooses the period having
the maximal net rewards, no matter when the rewards or costs are received. Consider now
an agent with self-control preferences. I solve his decision problem by backward induction. In
period 3, the agent solves the following problem
W3 = max{(1 + λ)v3 − I3,0} − λmax{v3,0}.
Since the agent always face the same decision problems if he does not stop before, I omit the
argument B in W3. Note that the cost I3 is incurred in the next period. It does not aﬀect the
current temptation. The agent is tempted to do the activity now and obtain v3, as illustrated
by the last term in the preceding equation. He succumbs to this temptation and there is no
self-control cost. In period 2, if the agent does the activity, he has payoﬀ (1 + λ)v2 − I2 since
the cost I2 does not aﬀect the current temptation utility. If he waits, he has payoﬀ W3. By the
7principle of optimality, the agent solves the following problem
W2 = max{(1 + λ)v2 − I2,W3} − λmax{v2,0} = 2.
Again the agent is tempted to do the activity now and succumbs to this temptation. Similarly,
in period 1, the problem is
W1 = max{(1 + λ)v1 − I1,W2} − λmax{v1,0}.
The agent is tempted to do the activity now. To resist this temptation, he must exercise costly
self-control. When the temptation is large enough or the agent’s level of self-control is low
enough, i.e., λ ≥ 0.5, the agent will succumb to the temptation and preproperate to do the
activity in period 1. By contrast, if 0 ≤ λ < 0.5, the agent is able to resist the temptation. He
then does the activity in period 2, just as an agent with standard preferences.
Example 2: (Procrastination) Suppose costs are immediate, v = {2,3,4}, and I = {1,1,3}.
Then, τ = 2, and τ∗ = 2 if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2. The agent never does the activity if λ > 2.
Again I solve this example by backward induction, but write the Bellman equations in the
appendix. When costs are immediate, the agent is tempted to delay. One can verify that if
λ > 2, the temptation utility is so high that the agent succumbs to the temptation to delay. He
then procrastinates and never completes the activity. By contrast, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2, he is able to
resist temptation and exercise self-control.
Example 3: (Preproperation) Suppose both costs and rewards are immediate, v = {2,3,4},
and I = {1,1,3}. Then, τ = 2, τ∗ = 1 if λ ≥ 1, and τ∗ = 2 if 0 ≤ λ < 1.
One can verify the above solution by solving Bellman equations given in the appendix.
Because the net rewards from doing the activity is positive, the agent is tempted to do the
activity now as in the case of immediate rewards in Example 1. If the temptation is high
enough, the agent cannot resist it and preproperates. Because the temptation utilities are
smaller than that in the case of immediate rewards, a higher self-control parameter is needed to
induce peproperation.
Example 4: (Preproperation) Suppose x = 100, I = 75 and rewards are immediate.
Because there is uncertainty, one has to use the method of stochastic dynamic programming
to solve this example. Because the Bellman equations are diﬀerent from those in the previous
examples, I describe them below:
8• In period 3,
W3 (2.25x) = max{(1 + λ)2.25x − I,0} − λmax{2.25x,0} = 150,
W3 (0.75x) = max{(1 + λ)0.75x − I,0} − λmax{0.75x,0} = 0,
W3 (0.25x) = max{(1 + λ)0.25x − I,0} − λmax{0.25x,0} = 0.
• In period 2,
W2 (1.5x) = max
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W2 (0.5x) = max
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• In period 1,
W1 (x) = max
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The interpretation of the preceding equations is similar to that in the case of certainty. The
diﬀerence is that here the decision problems depend on the states or decision nodes. Thus, I
use the states instead of decision problems at those states as the domain for the value functions.
Simple calculation reveals the following result. If 0 ≤ λ < 0.1, then the agent has enough
self-control so that he can resist the temptation to do the activity now. Thus, he waits to do
it in period 2 when the rewards go up to 1.5x. If the rewards go down to 0.5x, then he waits
and do the activity in period 3 when the rewards go up to 0.75x. This option exercise rule is
the same as that for the agent with standard preferences. By contrast, If λ ≥ 0.1, then the
temptation utility is so high that the agent cannot resist the temptation. Thus, he succumbs to
the temptation and does the activity in period 1.
Example 5: (Procrastination) Suppose x = 100, I = 75 and costs are immediate. Because
there is no discounting, as in example 4, an agent with standard preferences will complete the
activity in period 2 when the value of the rewards goes up to 1.5x. If the value of the rewards
goes down to 0.5x in period 2, the agent will wait and complete the activity in period 3 when
the value of the rewards goes up to 0.75x.
Consider now an agent with self-control preferences. Solving the Bellman equations given
in the appendix reveals the following result. Because the agent incurs immediate costs and
obtains delayed rewards when doing the activity, he is tempted to put oﬀ doing it. To resist this
temptation, he must exercise costly self-control. When λ > 2, the temptation utility is so high
9that the agent cannot resist the temptation to delay and will never complete the activity. When
0 < λ ≤ 2, the agent has enough self-control to resist the temptation. But he still procrastinates
one period and completes the activity in period 3 when the value of the rewards goes up to
2.25x.
Example 6: (Preproperation) Suppose x = 100, I = 100 and both costs and rewards are
immediate. This example illustrates that when both costs and rewards are immediate, the
agent with self-control preferences may preproperate. Since rewards are stochastic, an agent
with self-control preferences is tempted to do the activity now in ‘good’ states and is tempted
to wait in ‘bad’ states. It seems that there is no unambiguous conclusion. However, using the
Bellman equations given in the appendix, one can check that if λ ≥ 0.25, the agent with self-
control preferences does the activity in period 2 when the reward goes up to 1.5x. If the ward
goes down to 0.5x in period 2, then the agent waits and does it in period 3 when the reward
goes up to 2.25x. If 0 ≤ λ < 0.25, then the agent has enough self-control to resist temptations.
He does the activity in period 3 when the reward goes up to 2.25x. In this case, the agent does
the activity at the same time as an agent with standard preferences.
2.3 Optimal Stopping Rules
I now return to the inﬁnite horizon model described in Section 2.1. I solve the agent’s option
exercise problem by dynamic programming.7 The Bellman equations are diﬀerent for the cases
of immediate costs, immediate rewards and immediate costs and rewards. They are described
as follows.
1. Immediate Costs
W (x) = max
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W (x) = max
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7See Stokey and Lucas (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the theory of dynamic programming. The
existence of a bounded and continuous value function is guaranteed by the contraction mapping theorem.
103. Immediate Costs and Rewards
W (x) = max
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−λmax{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs}. (6)
I explain (4) in some detail. The interpretations of the other two equations are similar.
Suppose costs are immediate. In each period, the agent faces the decision problem of whether to
continue or to stop. Stopping incurs an immediate cost cs and gets a discounted payoﬀ from the
next period δΩ(x). After stopping, the agent has no further choice, and hence the continuation
value is zero. Because of the compromise between the temptation and the commitment utilities,
the total payoﬀ of stopping is δΩ(x) − (1 + λ)cs, which is the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst bracket in
(4). Continuation incurs an immediate cost cc and gets a discounted payoﬀ from the next period
δπ (x). The agent has to make the same choice of whether to stop or to continue in the next
period, and hence gets continuation value δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0). Thus, we have the second term in
the ﬁrst bracket in (4). Finally, the agent is tempted by whether to stop now and avoid the
cost of continuation cc or to continue and avoid the cost of stopping cs. The temptation utility
is λmax{−cc,−cs}, which is the last term in (4).
Clearly, continuation is optimal for those values of x for which the maximum in the ﬁrst line
of (4) is attained at the second term in the bracket. Immediate termination is optimal when
the opposite is true. Call the corresponding divisions of the range of x the continuation region
and the stopping region, respectively. A similar analysis applies to (5) and (6). In general, for
arbitrary payoﬀs π (x) and Ω(x), the continuation and stopping regions could be arbitrary. In
most applications, these regions can be easily characterized. In particular, there is a threshold
value such that it partitions the state space into a continuation region and a stopping region.
Consequently, the optimal stopping rule is characterized by a trigger policy. That is, the agent
stops the ﬁrst time the process (xt)t≥1 hits the threshold value. Importantly, depending on the
payoﬀ structure, the stopping region could be above the threshold value or below it. The former
case describes the problems of pursing upside potentials such as investment and job search. The
latter case describes the problems of avoiding downside potentials such as exit and default. Next
section will study these problems in detail.
Here I do not provide general conditions for the structure of the continuation and stopping
regions.8 Instead, I provide explicit characterizations of the threshold value for the case where
the agent pursues upside potentials. That is, I assume that the continuation region is below the
threshold value. In the applications in Section 3, I will impose explicit assumptions and provide
8See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for such conditions for standard preferences.
11a more complete and transparent analysis. In what follows, I denote by x∗ the threshold value for
the agent with self-control preferences and by x the threshold value for the agent with standard
preferences or preferences without self-control problems. Since the mean value of the option
exercise time increases with the threshold value, comparative static analysis for the threshold
value reveals properties of the average option exercise time.
Proposition 1 Suppose costs are immediate.
(i) The threshold value x∗ satisﬁes the equation
(1 − δ)[δΩ(x∗) − cs] + λ(1 − δ)[−cs − max{−cc,−cs}] (7)
























(ii) If cs ≥ cc, then x∗ ≥ x. If cs < cc, then x∗ < x.
The interpretation of (7) is as follows. The expression on the left side of equation (7) describes
the normalized per period beneﬁt from stopping, while the expression on the right side describes
the beneﬁt from continuation or the opportunity cost of stopping. The agent optimally stops at
the threshold value x∗ such that he is indiﬀerent between stopping and continuation.
When λ = 0, the model reduces to the one with standard preferences. It merits comments on
the components of the beneﬁt from continuation. The ﬁrst term in the second line of equation
(7) represents the one period beneﬁt. The other two terms represent the option value of waiting
when the agent waits for one more period and gets a better draw x0 > x∗ and a worse draw
x0 < x∗.
Importantly, all terms containing λ represent the cost of self-control. Speciﬁcally, the second
term in the ﬁrst line of (7) represents the normalize per period cost of self-control if the agent
chooses to stop. The third line of (7) represents the cost of self-control if the agent chooses to
continue.
For part (ii), if the cost of stopping is higher the cost of continuation, i.e., cs ≥ cc, then the
agent is tempted to continue. Thus, if the agent chooses to continue, there is no self-control
cost so that the term in the third line of (7) vanishes. By contrast, if the agent chooses to stop,
then he has to exercise self-control and incurs a cost given in the second term in the ﬁrst line of
(7). Consequently, compared with the standard model, the beneﬁt of stopping is lowered and
the agent procrastinates to exercise the option. The interpretation of the other case (cs < cc) is
similar.
12Proposition 2 Suppose rewards are immediate.
(i) The threshold value x∗ satisﬁes the equation
(1 − δ)[Ω(x∗) − δcs] + λ(1 − δ)[Ω(x∗) − max{π (x∗),Ω(x∗)}] (8)




























































(ii) If Ω(x) ≥ π (x) for all x, then x∗ ≤ x.
The interpretation of (8) is similar to that of (7). The diﬀerence is that here self-control
not only incurs a current period cost but also has an option value component. The former is
represented by the third line of (8). The latter is represented by the last two lines of equation
(8). This is because the agent is tempted by stochastic rewards in the next period. In the next
period the state may be better x0 > x∗ or worse x0 < x∗. Compared to the state at the threshold
value x∗, the cost of self-control at x0 may be higher or lower. Hence the option value component
may be positive or negative.
Consider part (ii). When the rewards from stopping are always higher than the rewards
from continuation, Ω(x) ≥ π (x), the agent is tempted to stop. Stopping at x∗ means the
agent succumbs to the temptation and hence there is no cost of self-control. Thus, the second
term in the ﬁrst line of (8) vanishes. If the agent decides to continue at x∗, he has to resist
the temptation to stop and hence incurs a cost of self-control represented by the third line of
(8). Consider next the option value component of the cost of self-control. In the next period,
if x0 > x∗, the agent stops and succumbs to the temptation. There is no cost of self-control
and hence the term in the last line of (8) vanishes. If x0 < x∗, the agent should continue and
incur a cost of self-control in the next period. Compared to the state at x∗, it may be higher or
lower and hence the option value component of the cost of self-control represented by the fourth
line of (8) may be positive or negative. It turns out that the current period cost of self-control
always outweighs the option value component of the self-control cost. This implies that the
beneﬁt from continuation is lowered, compared with the standard model. Consequently, the
agent preproperates to exercise the option.
Proposition 3 Suppose both costs and rewards are immediate.
13(i) The threshold value x∗ satisﬁes the equation
(1 − δ)[Ω(x∗) − cs] + (1 − δ)λ[Ω(x∗) − cs − max{π (x∗) − cc,Ω(x∗) − cs}] (9)
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(ii) If Ω(x) − cs ≥ π (x) − cc for all x, then x∗ ≤ x.
The interpretation of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 2. So I omit it.
Finally, when the continuation region is above the threshold value, the agent tries to avoid
downside potentials. This happens in the exit problem as described in the next section. One
can provide characterizations for the threshold value similar to Propositions 1-3.
3 Applications
This section applies the results in Section 2 to study investment and exit problems.
3.1 Investment
An important type of option exercise problems is the project investment problem. Consider
that an investor decides on whether and when to invest in a project with stochastic values xt
in period t. Investment incurs a sunk cost I. This investment problem can be cast into our
framework by setting
Ω(x) = x, cs = I, π (x) = cc = 0.
In standard investment problems, costs and beneﬁts come at the same time. In reality, there
are many instances where costs and beneﬁts do not arrive at the same time. For example, an
important feature of real investment is time to build. It is often the case that it takes time to
complete a factory or develop a new product. This is an instance of immediate costs and delayed
rewards. As a diﬀerent example, some ﬁrms start investing in a project ﬁnanced by borrowing.
14Debts may be gradually repaid after the ﬁrms earn proﬁts. This is an instance of immediate
rewards and delayed costs.
I now analyze these diﬀerent cases by rewriting the Bellman equations (4)-(6) as follows:
1. Immediate Costs
W (x) = max
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W (x) = max











3. Immediate Costs and Rewards
W (x) = max









− λmax{x − I,0}. (12)
From the above equations, the eﬀect of self-control is transparent. When rewards are imme-
diate, the investor is tempted to invest now. He may either succumb to temptation or exercise
costly self-control. Self-control acts as if the beneﬁt of waiting is lowered by λx. Thus, the
investor has an incentive to preproperate. By contrast, when costs are immediate, the investor
is tempted to wait. Self-control acts as if the cost of investment is increased by an amount of λI.
This causes the investor to procrastinate. The interesting case is when both costs and rewards
are immediate. When x > I, the investor is tempted to invest earlier. But when x < I, the
investor is tempted to wait. Thus, the result seems to be ambiguous. The following proposition
formalizes the preceding intuition and characterizes the optimal investment rule for each case.
Proposition 4 Under the conditions given in the appendix, there is a unique threshold value
x∗ ∈ [0,A] (x ∈ [0,A]) such that the investor with self-control preferences (standard preferences)
invests the ﬁrst time the process (xt)t≥1 reaches this value.
(i) If costs are immediate, then x∗ satisﬁes
(δx∗ − I)(1 − δ) − λI (1 − δ) = δ
Z A
x∗
δ (x − x∗)dF (x), (13)
and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, x∗ > x > I/δ and x∗ increases with λ.
(ii) If rewards are immediate, then x∗ satisﬁes
(x∗ − δI)(1 − δ) = δ
Z A
x∗
(x − x∗)dF (x) − λx∗ + λδ
Z x∗
0
(x∗ − x)dF (x), (14)
15and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, x∗ < x, x > δI and x∗ decreases with λ.
(iii) If both costs and rewards are immediate then x∗ satisﬁes
(x∗ − I)(1 − δ) = δ
Z A
x∗
(x − x∗)dF (x) (15)
−λ(x∗ − I) + λδ
Z x∗
0
[(x∗ − I) − max(0,x − I)]dF (x),
and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, I ≤ x∗ < x and x∗ decreases with λ.
I ﬁrst discuss brieﬂy the solution for the standard model corresponding to λ = 0. As is
well known, because of irreversibility and uncertainty, waiting has positive option value. The
option value for each case is represented by the ﬁrst term on the right side of the corresponding
equations (13)-(15). The investor with standard preferences invests at the time the threshold
value is higher than the cost. That is, at the time of investment the project has positive net
present value (NPV).
I next turn to the case with self-control. If costs are immediate, the investor is tempted
to wait. To resist this temptation, investing now must incur a self-control cost λI (1 − δ), this
lowers the beneﬁt from investment. Thus, the investor chooses to procrastinate, compared with
the standard model. Since x∗ increases with the self-control parameter λ, the agent delays
further as the self-control parameter becomes larger.9 When λ is suﬃciently large, x∗ may
exceed the upper bound A so that the investor never undertakes the investment project.
By contrast, if rewards are immediate, the investor is tempted to invest now. Waiting incurs
a direct current self-control cost λx∗. Importantly, self-control adds a positive option value of
waiting to invest, λδ
R x∗
0 (x∗ − x)dF (x). This is because, when the investor waits for one more
period and gets a worse draw x < x∗, he saves the cost of self-control.10 It turns out that the
former cost dominates the latter positive value. Thus, compared with the standard model, the
beneﬁt from waiting is lowered and the investor chooses to preproperate.
Since x∗ decreases with the self-control parameter λ, as λ gets larger and larger, the investor
invests sooner and sooner. When λ is suﬃciently large, the investor invests at a threshold value
lower than that prescribed by the NPV rule, whose threshold value is δI. This implies that the
investor may incur negative NPV at the time of investment. This seems counter-intuitive. In
fact, tempted by investing now, the investor may reason, “If I invest now, I get a reward and
9The mean value of the waiting time of investment is given by (1 − F (x
∗))
−1 . It is increasing in the threshold
value x
∗.
10When he gets a better draw x > x
∗, the investor succumbs to the temptation of investing so that there is no
self-control cost.
16incur a cost in the future. If I do not invest now, I have to exercise costly self-control. The
cost of self-control may outweigh the option value of waiting. Thus, I prefer to invest now even
though I get negative NPV.” In reality, we do observe the phenomena that investors rush to
embark on investments with negative NPV. For example, Rook (1987) ﬁnds empirical evidence
that the presence of credit opportunities results in present-oriented, unplanned, and impulse
buying.
I now consider the case where both costs and rewards are immediate. It is important to
observe that the investor would never invest at a project value less than the cost; that is, x∗
cannot be less than I. This is because when x∗ < I, the investor has no temptation to invest and
can choose costlessly not to invest, thereby obtaining the outside value zero. Given x∗ ≥ I, at
the threshold value x∗ the investor is tempted to invest. There is no self-control cost of investing
at x∗ so that the last term in the ﬁrst line of (9) vanishes. Consider now the self-control cost of
waiting. Waiting incurs a direct self-control cost λ(x∗ − I). Waiting also saves the cost of self-
control by an amount represented by the last term in (15) when the investor gets a worse draw
x < x∗. When he gets a better draw x > x∗, the investor succumbs to temptation of investing
so that there is no self-control cost. It turns out the direct self-control cost dominates so that
the beneﬁt from waiting is lowered. Thus, compared with the standard model, the investor
preproperates. Note that as in the case of immediate rewards, x∗ decreases with the self-control
parameter λ. As λ is suﬃciently large, the threshold value approaches the value I under the
myopic rule.
I now turn to welfare implications. I ask the question: How severely does the self-control
problem hurt a person? I compute the utility loss from investment for an investor with self-
control preferences, compared with an investor with standard preferences. Let V (x) be the
value function for the investor with standard preferences corresponding to λ = 0. The utility
loss from self-control problems is measured as V (x∗)−W (x∗). The following proposition gives
the utility loss.
Proposition 5 Let x∗ and x be given in Proposition 4. When costs are immediate, the utility
loss from investment is given by λI. When rewards are immediate or both costs and rewards are
immediate, the utility loss from investment is given by x − x∗.
By Proposition 4, when costs are immediate, the investor with self-control preferences pro-
crastinates – he waits when he should invest if he had standard preferences. The utility loss is
the forgone project value. This loss is increasing in the self-control parameter λ. However, it
does not increase with λ without bound. This is because as λ approaches the value δA/I − 1,
the investment threshold x∗ approaches the upper bound of the project value A. When λ is
17λ Threshold Waiting Time Utility Loss
0 0.96 22.5
Immediate Costs 0.3 0.97 36.0 0.40
0.6 0.99 90.0 0.77
0 0.74 4.0
Immediate Rewards 0.3 0.49 2.0 0.87
0.6 0.32 1.5 1.44
Immediate Costs 0 0.76 4.2
and Rewards 0.3 0.69 3.2 0.29
0.6 0.65 2.8 0.44
Table 1: This table presents solutions for the investment threshold values, the mean waiting time
until investment and the utility loss. The utility loss is measured as (V (x∗) − W (x∗))/V (x∗).
increased further, no investment is ever made and the agent gets zero. Thus, the upper bound of
the utility loss is δA−I. When rewards are immediate or both costs and reward are immediate,
the investor with self-control preferences preproperates – he invests when he should wait if he
had standard preferences. The utility loss is then the forgone option value of waiting.
The following example illustrates Propositions 4-5 numerically.
Example 7: Let A = 1, δ = 0.9, I = 0.5, and F (x) = x. Table 1 reports the solution. It
reveals that even for small self-control problems, i.e. small λ, the utility loss could be quite
large. For example, when costs are immediate and λ = 0.6, the investor procrastinates about
70 periods to invest. The utility loss accounts for 77% of the project value. When rewards
are immediate and λ = 0.6, the investor preproperates and invests in negative NPV projects
since the investment threshold 0.32 is less than that δI = 0.45 according to the NPV rule. The
utility loss accounts for 144% of the option value. When both costs and rewards are immediate,
the investor also preproperates. But the utility loss is less than that in the case of immediate
rewards.
183.2 Exit
For the ﬁrm exit problem, the process (xt)t≥1 could be interpreted as the stochastic proﬁt ﬂows.
Stay in business incurs a ﬁxed cost cf > 0. Let the scrapping value of the ﬁrm be zero. The
owner/manager decides when and if to shut down the ﬁrm and exit from business. This problem
ﬁts into our framework by setting
Ω(x) = 0, cs = 0, π (x) = x, cc = cf.
As in the investment problem described in the preceding subsection, there are many instances
that proﬁts and costs may not come at the same time. Thus, I consider various cases and rewrite
the Bellman equations (4)-(6) as follows:
1. Immediate Costs
W (x) = max











W (x) = max










3. Immediate Costs and Rewards
W (x) = max









− λmax{x − cf,0}. (18)
The following proposition characterizes the solution.
Proposition 6 Under the conditions given in the appendix, there is a unique threshold value
x∗ ∈ [0,A] (x ∈ [0,A]) such that the owner with self-control preferences (standard preferences)
shuts down the ﬁrm the ﬁrst time the process (xt)t≥1 falls below this value.
(i) If costs are immediate, then x∗ satisﬁes
0 = δx∗ − cf + δ
Z A
x∗
δ (x − x∗)dF (x) − λcf, (19)
and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, x∗ > x, x < cf/δ and x∗ increases with λ.
(ii) If rewards are immediate, then x∗ satisﬁes
−λx∗ (1 − δ) = x∗ − δcf + δ
Z A
x∗
(x − x∗)dF (x) − λδ
Z x∗
0
(x − x∗)dF (x), (20)
19and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, x∗ < x < δcf and x∗ decreases with λ.
(iii) If both costs and rewards are immediate, then x∗ satisﬁes
0 = x∗ − cf + δ
Z A
x∗
(x − x∗)dF (x) (21)
+λ(x∗ − cf) + λδ
Z A
x∗
(x − x∗ − max{x − cf,0})dF (x),
and x is the solution for λ = 0. Moreover, cf ≥ x∗ > x and x∗ increases with λ.
In the standard model (λ = 0), because of irreversibility and uncertainty, there is a positive
option value of waiting in the hope of getting better shocks. The ﬁrm will not exit as soon as it
incurs loss since keeping it alive has an option value. The option value from stay in business for
each case is represented by the second term in the right side of equations (19)-(21), respectively.
Only when the loss is large enough, the ﬁrm exits.
I now discuss the case where the owner has self-control preferences. When costs are imme-
diate, the owner is tempted to exit. Exercising self-control is costly. The cost of self control is
represented by the last term in (19). It lowers the beneﬁt from stay in the business. Thus, he
preproperates and exits earlier. Note that the exit threshold x∗ is increasing in the self-control
parameter λ.11 When λ is large enough, x∗ approaches the upper bound of proﬁts A. In this
case, the owner succumbs to temptation and shuts down the ﬁrm right away even if the ﬁrm
can still make positive net proﬁts.
When rewards are immediate, the owner is tempted to stay in business. He procrastinates
to shut down the ﬁrm. There are two eﬀects in force. First, exit incurs a direct self-control cost
given by the expression in the left side of (20). This cost lowers the beneﬁt from exit. Second,
stay in business has a positive option value from self-control. This is because when the ﬁrm gets
a bad shock, it can save self-control costs. These two eﬀects imply that the exit threshold x∗
is lower than x so that the ﬁrm stays longer in business. When λ is large enough, x∗ approach
zero and the owner still keeps the ﬁrm alive even though he suﬀers substantial losses.
Consider the case where both costs and rewards are immediate. Since proﬁts are stochastic,
the owner is tempted to stay if proﬁts are higher than the ﬁxed cost and is tempted to exit if
proﬁts are lower than the ﬁxed cost. It seems that there is no unambiguous conclusion. However,
it is important to note that the ﬁrm will never exit at the proﬁt level higher than the ﬁxed cost.
Otherwise, at that proﬁt level the owner has no temptation to exit. Thus, stay for one more
period incurs no self-control cost and the ﬁrm can still make positive proﬁts. Because of this
11The mean value of the exit time is given by F (x
∗)
−1 , which decreases with the threshold value.
20fact, at the exit threshold, the owner cannot make positive proﬁts and has a temptation to exit.
Exercising self-control is costly, which lowers the beneﬁt from stay. The cost of self-control is
represented by the last two terms in equation (21). Thus, the ﬁrm preproperates and exits earlier
than the model with standard preferences. Part (iii) of Proposition 6 also implies that the exit
threshold x∗ increases with λ. Thus, when λ is suﬃciently large, x∗ approaches the ﬁxed cost cf
so that the ﬁrm exits according to the myopic rule. The cost of self-control erodes completely
away the option value of waiting.
I ﬁnally consider the welfare implications. Similarly to Proposition 5, the following proposi-
tion gives the utility loss due to self-control problems.
Proposition 7 Let x∗ and x be given in Proposition 6. When costs are immediate, the utility
loss is given by δx∗ − δx. When rewards are immediate, the utility loss is given by λx∗. When
both rewards and costs are immediate, the utility loss is given by x∗ − x.
By Proposition 6, when costs are immediate or both rewards and costs are immediate, the
owner preproperates – he exits when he should stay if he had standard preferences. The utility
loss is the forgone proﬁt opportunities. When rewards are immediate, the owner procrastinates
– he stays when he should exits if he had standard preferences. The utility loss is the cost of
self-control incurred from resisting the temptation to stay. As in the investment model, this
cost does not increases with λ without bound. When λ is suﬃciently large, the exit threshold
approaches zero and the owner never shuts down the ﬁrm. The maximal utility loss from keeping
the ﬁrm alive is δ (cf − Ex)/(1 − δ), which is the absolute value of the NPV of proﬁts and is
positive by the assumption in the appendix.
The following example illustrates Propositions 6-7 numerically.
Example 8: Let A = 1,δ = 0.9,cf = 0.6, and F (x) = x. Table 2 reports the solution. It
reveals the following: When costs are immediate, the owner shuts down the ﬁrm too early even
if he suﬀers from very small self-control problems, i.e., λ = 0.2. The ﬁrm exits at the proﬁt level
0.78, which is bigger than the ﬁxed cost 0.6. If the owner had standard preferences, he should
exit at the value 0.59 less than the ﬁxed cost because of the option value of waiting. The utility
loss accounts for 24% of the proﬁts. When rewards are immediate, the owner procrastinates to
exit. He suﬀers from larger and larger losses if he has less and less self-control since the proﬁt
level at exit becomes smaller and smaller. The utility loss is proportional to λ since it is equal to
λx∗/x∗ = λ. When both costs and rewards are immediate, the owner preproperates. However,
the utility loss is less than that when costs are immediate.
21λ Threshold Waiting Time Utility Loss
0 0.59 1.7
Immediate Costs 0.2 0.78 1.3 0.24
0.4 0.93 1.1 0.36
0 0.35 2.9
Immediate Rewards 0.2 0.31 3.2 0.2
0.4 0.28 3.5 0.4
Immediate Costs 0 0.48 2.1
and Rewards 0.2 0.50 2.0 0.04
0.4 0.51 1.9 0.07
Table 2: This table presents solutions for the exit threshold values, the mean waiting time until
exit and the utility loss. The utility loss is measured as the fraction of the proﬁts at exit.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the option exercise problem for an agent who is tempted by immediate
gratiﬁcation and suﬀers from self-control problems. I adopt the Gul-Pesendorfer self-control
utility model and provide an explanation for procrastination and preproperation based on time
consistency. Unlike the time-inconsistency approach which depends on the expectations about
future selves’ preferences, there is no multiplicity of predictions. When applied to the investment
and exit problems, the present model has a number of testable implications. For example, the
present model implies that overinvestment, excess entry, procrastination to terminate a project
or shut down a ﬁrm may be the rational choices of those investors/managers/entrepreneurs
having self-control preferences, who are tempted by immediate proﬁt opportunities. On the
other hand, the opposite phenomena can be caused by such decision makers who are tempted
to avoid immediate costs. Further, when both costs and rewards are immediate, the myopic
option exercise rule may be optimal for such decision makers, who have suﬃciently low levels of
self-control.
In terms of future research, it should be important to conduct empirical or experimental
analyses to diﬀerentiate between the time-consistency approach and the usual time-inconsistency
approach.
22Appendix
A Solutions to the Examples in Section 2.2
Example 2: I describe the agent’s decision problem by the following Bellman equations:
W3 = max{v3 − (1 + λ)I3,0} − λmax{−I3,0},
W2 = max{v2 − (1 + λ)I2,W3} − λmax{−I2,0},
W1 = max{v1 − (1 + λ)I1,W2} − λmax{−I1,0}.
One can verify the solution using these Bellman equations.
Example 3: One can verify the solution using the following Bellman equations:
W3 = max{(1 + λ)(v3 − I3),0} − λmax{v3 − I3,0},
W2 = max{(1 + λ)(v2 − I2),W3} − λmax{v2 − I2,0},
W1 = max{(1 + λ)(v1 − I1),W2} − λmax{v1 − I1,0}.
Example 5: One can verify the solution using the following Bellman equations:
• In period 3,
W3 (2.25x) = max{2.25x − (1 + λ)I,0} − λmax{−I,0},
W3 (0.75x) = max{0.75x − (1 + λ)I,0} − λmax{−I,0},
W3 (0.25x) = max{0.25x − (1 + λ)I,0} − λmax{−I,0}.
• In period 2,
W2 (1.5x) = max
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W2 (0.5x) = max










• In period 1,
W1 (x) = max










23Example 6: One can verify the solution using the following Bellman equations:
• In period 3,
W3 (2.25x) = max{(1 + λ)(2.25x − I),0} − λmax{2.25x − I,0},
W3 (0.75x) = max{(1 + λ)(0.75x − I),0} − λmax{0.75x − I,0},
W3 (0.25x) = max{(1 + λ)(0.25x − I),0} − λmax{0.25x − I,0}.
• In period 2,
W2 (1.5x) = max










W2 (0.5x) = max










• In period 1,
W1 (x) = max









− λmax{x − I,0}.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) The value function W satisﬁes
W (x) =

δΩ(x) − (1 + λ)cs − λmax{−cc,−cs} if x ≥ x∗,
δπ (x) − (1 + λ)cc + δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0) − λmax{−cc,−cs} if x < x∗.
(B.1)
Since W (x) is continuous at the threshold value x∗,




























+ δπ (x∗) − (1 + λ)cc.
Substituting (B.1) into this equation yields







W (x)dF (x) + δπ
 
x0














+ δπ (x∗) − (1 + λ)cc
24Using (B.2) to substitute δ
R
W (x)dF (x) delivers






















+δπ (x∗) − (1 + λ)cc.
Subtracting [δΩ(x∗) − (1 + λ)cs]δF (x∗) on each side of the above equation yields






















+δπ (x∗) − (1 + λ)cc.
Subtracting [δΩ(x∗) − (1 + λ)cs]δ [1 − F (x∗)] on each side of the above equation and simplifying
yield the desired result.
(ii) If cs ≥ cc, then
λ[cs (1 − δ) − δ max{−cc,−cs} − cc] = λ(1 − δ)(cs − cc) ≥ 0.
If cs < cc, then
λ[cs (1 − δ) − δ max{−cc,−cs} − cc] = λ(cs − cc) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) The value function W satisﬁes
W (x) =

(1 + λ)Ω(x) − δcs − λmax{π (x),Ω(x)} if x ≥ x∗,
(1 + λ)π (x) − δcc + δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0) − λmax{π (x),Ω(x)} if x < x∗.
(B.3)
Since W (x) is continuous at the threshold value x∗, it follows that
(1 + λ)Ω(x∗) − δcs



























+ (1 + λ)π (x∗) − δcc
25Substitute (B.3) into this equation to deduce



















[(1 + λ)Ω(x) − δcs − λmax{π (x),Ω(x)}]dF (x) + (1 + λ)π (x∗) − δcc
Using (B.4) to substitute δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0) yields








{(1 + λ)Ω(x) − δcs − λmax{π (x),Ω(x)}}dF (x) + (1 + λ)π (x∗) − δcc
Subtract [(1 + λ)Ω(x∗) − δcs]δF (x∗) on each side of the above equation to derive



















+ (1 + λ)π (x∗) − δcc.
Finally, subtract [(1 + λ)Ω(x∗) − δcs]δ [1 − F (x∗)] on each side of the above equation and re-
arrange to deduce

















+π (x∗) − δcc + λπ (x∗) − λδ
Z
max{π (x),Ω(x)}dF (x).
Rearranging yields the desired result.








[Ω(x) − max{π (x),Ω(x)}]dF (x)




[π (x) − Ω(x)]dF (x) − λ[1 − δF (x∗)][Ω(x∗) − π (x∗)] < 0.
Thus, x∗ ≤ x.
26Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Rewrite the value function as follows
W (x) =

(1 + λ)(Ω(x) − cs) − λmax{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs} if x ≥ x∗,
(1 + λ)(π (x) − cc) + δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0) − λmax{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs} if x < x∗.
(B.5)
Since W (x) is continuous at the threshold value x∗, it follows that
(1 + λ)(Ω(x∗) − cs)



























+ (1 + λ)(π (x∗) − cc)
Substitute (B.5) into this equation to deduce



















{(1 + λ)(Ω(x) − cs) − λmax{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs}}dF (x) + (1 + λ)(π (x∗) − cc)
Use (B.6) to substitute δ
R
W (x0)dF (x0) to deduce










{(1 + λ)(Ω(x) − cs) − λmax{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs}}dF (x) + (1 + λ)(π (x∗) − cc)
Subtract (1 + λ)(Ω(x∗) − cs)δF (x∗) on each side of the above equation to derive




{(1 + λ)(π (x) − π (x∗))}dF (x) − λδ
Z




{(1 + λ)(Ω(x) − cs)}dF (x) + (1 + λ)(π (x∗) − cc).
Finally, subtract [(1 + λ)Ω(x∗) − cs]δ [1 − F (x∗)] on each side of the above equation and rear-
range to deduce




(1 + λ)[π (x) − π (x∗)]dF (x) + δ
Z A
x∗
(1 + λ)[Ω(x) − Ω(x∗)]dF (x)
+(1 + λ)(π (x∗) − cc) − λδ
Z
max{π (x) − cc,Ω(x) − cs}dF (x).
27Rearranging yields the desired result.
(ii) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: The equations determining x∗ are derived from Propositions 1-3.
One can verify that the left sides of these equations are increasing functions of x∗, while the right
sides are decreasing functions of x∗. To show that there is a unique solution to these equations,
one need only show that there is a unique intersection point for each pair of curves implied by
those functions. To guarantee this, the following conditions are necessary and suﬃcient:
• For part (i), δA ≥ (1 + λ)I.
• For part (ii),
(1 − δ)(A − δI) ≥ −λA + λδ
Z A
0
(A − x)dF (x),
• For part (iii),
(1 − δ)(A − I) ≥ −λ(A − I) + λδ
Z A
0
(A − I − max(0,x − I))dF (x).
Figure 2 illustrates part (i). As λ is increased, the curve implied by the left side of (13) shifts
down so that x∗ increases. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly.
Proof of Proposition 5: When costs are immediate, the agent with standard preferences
has already made the investment at x∗ since his investment threshold x < x∗. Thus, V (x∗) =
δx∗ − I and the welfare loss is V (x∗) − W (x∗) = (δx∗ − I) − (δx∗ − (1 + λ)I) = λI. When
rewards are immediate, the agent with standard preferences does not invest at x∗ since his
investment threshold x > x∗. Thus, V (x∗) = δ
R
V (x0)dF (x0) = x − δI and the welfare loss
is V (x∗) − W (x∗) = (x − δI) − (x∗ − δI) = x − x∗. The case with both immediate costs and
rewards is similar to the case with immediate rewards.
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4. The conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of the threshold value are given below:
• For part (i), δA ≥ (1 + λ)cf ≥ δ
R A
0 δxdF (x),
• For part (ii),
Z A
0
xdF (x) ≤ cf ≤ A(1 + λ(1 − δ))/δ − λ
Z A
0
(x − A)dF (x)
28• For part (iii),
δ
R A
0 xdF (x) + λδ
R cf
0 xdF (x)
1 + λ[1 − δ (1 − F (cf))]
≤ cf ≤ A.
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5. When costs are
immediate, since x∗ > x, an agent with standard preferences will not exit at x∗. V (x∗) =
δx∗ − cf + δ
R
V (x0)dF (x0) = δx∗ − cf − (δx − cf) = δx∗ − δx. Since W (x∗) = 0, the utility
loss is V (x∗) − W (x∗) = δx∗ − δx. When rewards are immediate, since x∗ < x, V (x∗) =
0. Since W (x∗) = −λx∗, V (x∗) − W (x∗) = λx∗. Finally, when both costs and rewards are
immediate, V (x∗) = x∗−cf +δ
R
V (x0)dF (x0) = x∗−cf −(x − cf) = x∗−x. Since W (x∗) = 0,
V (x∗) − W (x∗) = x∗ − x.
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Figure 2: The determination of the threshold value x∗.
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